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Abstract:  
 
In 2009, the 1.3 million hectare agricultural project planned in Madagascar by Daewoo 
Logistics exemplified the paradoxical position of the Malagasy state; simultaneously 
encouraging the development of large-scale acquisition and implementing a land reform to 
secure local land rights. Opposition to the project was successful mainly thanks to the efforts 
of international NGOs and to the rhetorical value of the land issue in national political debate. 
Despite this well publicised victory against large scale foreign land investment in Madagascar,    
the trend of large scale land acquisition continues and raises a number of questions of interest 
to this article. On the ground, what are the dynamics of local politics within the framework of 
the ongoing farmland acquisition projects? Furthermore, what are the impacts of the recent 
land reform on investors’ land access modalities?  
 
The article attempts to provide a snapshot of the numerous and complicated interactions, and 
overlapping of land rights which exist in areas targeted by investors. Whereas legal 
procedures to access land do not guarantee local and legal land rights due to the imperfect 
implementation of laws, informal land deals seem to take into account a broader spectrum of 
rights, legitimated on the basis either of local land access practices or of positive law. This 
paper also shows that for the moment, local protests to important land-related investments are 
rather limited in Madagascar and analyses the reasons why they are so  (most plantations are 
just starting, available information is scarce, private agribusiness look very much like 
international development project...).  
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I. Introduction 
 
In the autumn of 2008, the “Daewoo case”, a large-scale land acquisition project in 
Madagascar, created a media buzz. Various international media, following the Financial Times 
(Blas 2008), wrote about the negotiation undertaken between the South Korean company, 
Daewoo Logistics, and the Malagasy government. In addition to implementing roads and new 
cities, the project planned to produce palm oil and corn on 1,300,00 ha for export  to the 
Korean market.  
 
The first negotiations regarding the leasing of such a large tract of farmland brought into 
question the coherence of national policies. The opaque promotion of foreign large-scale land 
acquisitions appeared incompatible with the recent land reform which aimed to secure land 
access at the local level (Teyssier et al., 2010).  
 
Primarily through the internet and media networks, opposition to this land transfer came 
initially from the Malagasy diaspora, particularly from the Collective for the Defence of 
Malagasy Land1, in connection with various international Non Governmental Organisations 
(CCFD, Via Campesina, GRAIN, Peuples Solidaires) (Rakotondrainibe et al., 2010). This 
international opposition initially failed to hit home with the local population until a political 
crisis erupted in the capital of Madagascar in December 2008 (op. cit). The opponents of 
President Ravalomanana’s regime had diverse claims to make but seized the sensitive land 
issue. They cited the Daewoo case as an example of how President Ravalomanana was 
stripping the country of its national resources and emphasized how foreign investors like 
Daewoo could jeopardize local land-based livelihoods by usurping Malagasy ancestral lands 
(Pelerin, 2009). Using this argument amongst others, they successfully mobilised the masses 
and toppled the Ravalomanana government in March 2009.  
 
The media buzz on large-scale land acquisitions fuelled the Malagasy political protest and this 
national opposition, in turn, fuelled the international debates and protests against the so-called 
“land grabbing” phenomenon. The new president, Rajoelina, was front and centre of 
opposition to these foreign projects. He announced in his first public speech his opposition to 
the Daewoo project which ultimately contributed to the projects failure. Thus, the opposition 
to Daewoo’s project was successful mainly thanks to the efforts of the NGOs and to the value 
of using the land issue in political debate. 
 
Social and political reactions at the national level were strong and succeeded in grinding the 
Daewoo project to a halt. However, the latter has masked agricultural projects of lesser scope 
that are still ongoing (Andrianirina Ratsialonana et al. 2011).  
 
Thus the Daewoo case provides a valuable starting point in the analysis of the complexities of 
large scale land acquisition in Madagascar. The article analyses the dynamics of local politics 
within the framework of large-scale farmland acquisition projects in Madagascar. It also 
                                                 
1 
  http://terresmalgaches.info/. The Collective launched campaign in January 2009 against 
“the Daewoo affair”. 
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studies whether the new land reform, based on the recognition of local land rights and the 
decentralisation of land management, have changed the elected and the sstate representatives’ 
stance and empowered local rights holders. It then seeks to open the first discussions on the 
impact of the recent land reform on democratic governance.  
 
 The article begins by discussing the impact of the Daewoo case and  the change of 
government on the national politics in relation to investment and land issues.  Despite publicly 
opposing foreign investment, the current government has continued its predecessors’ policies 
of supporting international investment in Madagascar. Nevertheless, it has implemented new 
legislation to regulate large-scale land investments and, above all, to control local informal 
negotiations. But risks for local groups and investors do not arise out of a lack of legislation 
or of any conflict of law but rather from the tension between the legislation and its effective 
enforcement (see also Evers et al., forthcoming).  
 
On the basis of some ongoing cases, the second part presents the complex overlapping of land 
rights on areas targeted by investors. It analyses how agribusiness projects create land 
conflicts and reactivate former tensions, being whether or not in relation with land issues. 
Tensions and conflicts arise not only between developers and the local groups, but also 
amongst local groups and different state services. When investors start formal procedures to 
access land, local and legal land rights are partly not respected due to the imperfect 
implementation of laws. Conflicts erupt in the legal forum but claims draw only from the 
positive law (domain of lex fori) and not from the local practices of land access (lex loci). 
Thus, the formal nature of the land access procedure makes local actors change legal forum, 
from lex loci to lex fori, in order to fight for their rights. When investors negotiate informal 
land access, the negotiation takes into account a larger range of arguments, legitimated on the 
basis of local land access practices as positive law.   
 
Thirdly, the article analyses the role that certain mayors play in negotiations with investors. It 
is argued that some mayors play a pivotal role in welcoming and facilitating private 
investment projects, as they do or have done in the past with international aid projects.  Their 
privileged stature as brokers (Bierschenk et al 2000) puts them in a position to attract this new 
“revenue”.  Since they can sometimes be the sole interlocutor of the project's developer, there 
is a risk that local populations are not sufficiently consulted and informed. 
   
The last section concludes on the effects of the on-going land reform on the international land 
deals and on the perspective to strengthen this policy.   
 
Methodology 
 
Data on actors’ land strategies were collected through hundred in-depth interviews with 
agents from public institutions, regional or local governments, private developers, 
populations, and other key informants. The interviews were conducted by the authors in the 
capital city, Antananarivo, and in regions favoured by investors in 2010 and 2011. 
 
 
II. Was the Daewoo case a turning point?  
 
The Ravalomanana government (2002-2009) envisaged international investments as vehicles 
to fuel the economic development of Madagascar and develop new economic partnerships. 
Due to an incentive policy and the multiplication of investors looking for natural resources or 
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market opportunities, foreign direct investment flows increased from 95 million USD in 2005 
to 1,445 million USD in 2008 (UNCTAD, FDI database, March 2010). These were mainly 
directed towards the mining sector and, ito a lesser extent but in an unexpected way, towards 
the agricultural sector.  Focusing on state-owned resources, these flows gave the government 
the opportunity to control new funding: private investment coming from northern and 
southern countries (European or North American countries as well as Asian countries).  
 
The new Rajoelina government has maintained the policies of the former government with 
regards to international investment. Nevertheless, as they themselves attracted criticism from 
the international community for their unilateral management of the political crisis, the 
transitional authorities started criticizing exclusive dependency on western investments and 
looking for other sources of investments. New foreign economic partnerships are therefore 
still promoted, all the more as international aid has been suspended in the meantime. The 
government has concluded contracts in the mining sector, discussed opportunities to sell water 
access and stayed open to agricultural investments. The Daewoo case and the large-scale land 
acquisition issue were therefore arguably more a case of political rhetoric to destabilise the 
former President than a definitive opposition to foreign large-scale land investments (Evers et 
al., forthcoming). 
 
Nevertheless, the Rajoelina government has also implemented new regulation (Circulaire 
N°2010-321), explicitly advocating land lease2. Moreover, approbation is compulsory to start 
the formal procedure to access land.  Each project planning to develop more than 250 hectares 
has to be evaluated and approved by a commission composed of representatives of each 
concerned ministries, or, more than 2 500 ha, by the Council of Ministers. On this basis, the 
government aims to organize the different procedures and to guide the investors who are often 
lost in front of the proliferation of required documents. It also seeks to obtain and centralize 
information on the on-going agribusiness projects. Between 2005 and 2010, approximately 50 
agribusiness projects were announced or revealed in media and research reports (Andrianirina 
Ratsialonana et al. 2011).  An aggregate total of nearly 3,000,000 ha of land has been affected 
(65% for food production, 32% for biofuel, 3% for forest plantations)3 (op. cit.). Despite the 
number and the scope of these projects, the central government had information, sometimes 
very scarce, on only a third of these projects. Investment projects in the agricultural sector are 
often negotiated behind closed doors, but only some of them at government level because lots 
of investors directly address regional or local representatives. Thus, through this new 
                                                 
2 
 The sale is not even forbidden. The new constitution, proposed by Rajoelina’s political party and 
accepted by referendum in December 2010, is ambivalent on that point. A first draft of the constitution 
mentioned explicitly, right from the start, that sale and land lease longer than 30 years for foreigners were 
forbidden. However, the new constitution refers to the existing laws and, thus, to the investment law. The latter 
includes the right of non-national investors to acquire land. It allows this through the delivery of an acquisition 
permit (autorisation d’acquisition) for all foreign investors possessing a Malagasy company (Law N° 2007-036), 
which in practice is quite straightforward because the only condition is to have one of the associates registered as 
a resident. However, the modalities of enforcement of this authorisation are still vague in the absence of the 
enabling decree (Andrianirina Ratsialonana et al. 2011). 
 
3 
 This surface area was significant considering that  that, on the whole island, only 2,000,000 hectares are 
cultivated by 2,5 million family farms)(MAEP, 2004). It also represented— although the methodologies and 
definitions used are open to question—15 to 37% of potentially arable land. These lands are estimated to be 
about 15 to 20 million ha by FAO (2007), and 8 million ha by the Ministry of Agriculture (2008) (Andrianirina 
Ratsialonana et al. 2011).  
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legislation, the government wants to recall to the regional and local leaders and clerks the 
authority of the central administration. Its objective is to implement a better regulation of the 
agribusiness projects but also probably to exercise a better control on the associated financial 
resources.  
 
This new legislation complements existing land laws. The legal procedure to access state-
owned land was modified with the launch of the new land policy in 2005. This new land 
policy aims at the recognition of local land rights and at the decentralisation of land 
management (Teyssier et al. 2009). Prior to 2005, all land subject to claims of customary 
ownership and untitled land was deemed to be state-owned. The only way to legally secure 
land was to obtain a title deed delivered by the state land registry services. Now, untitled but 
occupied land is no longer the property of the state. Land claimed by local people may be 
deemed ‘untitled private property’. Moreover, local governments (municipalities) have been 
granted new powers. By creating a local land registry office, they are responsible for 
recognizing private property rights on the basis of pre-existing customary rights and they can 
issue individual or collective land certificates. The property is no longer created by the state 
administration officers but recognised by a local commission4 on the basis of pre-existing 
local rights5. As a consequence of this new legislation, the state, via the land administration, 
can only lease or sell the state-owned land, thus it can neither lease nor sell land that includes 
or encroaches upon titled private property, special status zones (national parks, land reserves) 
or un-titled private property or occupied land. 
 
Thus, the land laws are in line with FAO, UNCTAD, and the World Bank principles for 
agricultural investment mentioning the obligation of “respecting land and resource rights”. 
Coupled with environmental law6, these different legislations aim at securing land rights and 
the interests of local groups. They also theoretically permit the coherence of policies 
promoting investment and securing land rights. However, risks for local groups and investors 
do not arise out of any lack of legislation or out of any conflict of law but rather out of the 
tensions between the legislation and its effective enforcement (Evers et al., forthcoming). 
 
 
III. Targeted land: overlapping rights realities  
 
Since 2009, investment flow into Madagascar has substantially decreased. Of the 52 projects 
announced and listed between 2005 and 2009, one-third of the projects proceeded no further 
                                                 
4 
 This local commission is comprised of elected representatives of the village and neighbors of the 
concerned claimant. 
 
5 
 Users can choose the means of formalizing their land rights: title deeds and certificates confer similar 
property rights – the second being 30 times less expensive – 15 USD instead of 507 USD, and 12 times quicker 
to obtain – in average 6 months instead of 6 years (ECR  2008; Teyssier et al. 2009). 
 
6 
 An environmental law (decree MECIE, 2004), enforced by the National Agency for Environment 
(Office National pour l’Environnement), specifies that all agricultural projects bigger than 1 000 ha must get an 
environmental license. This license is delivered only after the validation of an impact assessment including 
environmental and socio-economic criteria. 
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than land prospection or were halted (Andrianirina Ratsialonana et al. 2011)7. Nevertheless, 
about 30 projects are still active8. The targeted land area currently totals about 150,000 ha, 20 
times less than the surface areas contemplated by the 52 projects. Biofuel, for national and 
international markets, is the main objective (96% of project lands). To our knowledge, only 14 
private companies have started their agricultural projects and realized their first plantations 
(maximum several hundred hectares per project). They are mainly funded by foreign 
investment (12 out of 14)—for the most part from European origins. They aim to produce 
sugar cane, cassava or jatropha-based biofuel (11 out of 14). These companies, the majority 
with little experience in the agricultural sector, plan to develop large-scale plantations to an 
overall land area of between 5,000 and 30,000 ha, based on mechanisation and a wage system.  
The investors seek land with common characteristics: good pedoclimatic conditions adapted 
to the planned crop and mechanisation; from 10,000 to 30,000 ha; ‘non- or under-productive’, 
‘un-owned land’—the targeted land is thus supposed to be state-owned; and for the most part, 
the proximity of a national road or a port for the transportation of inputs. Investors look 
mainly for tanety (flat land) and not for shoal land suitable for rice production. Even if they 
are qualified as non- or under-valued by investors, tanety are likely to be pastures or reserves 
of wood (firewood being the household’s primary source of energy). Moreover, investors look 
for large single tracts of land so as to facilitate the inclusion of crop plots. 
 
With the exception of one consortium of Malagasy investors planning to buy approximately 
20,000 ha, other developers (all foreigners) favour leasing rather than outright ownership. 
Considering the land as state-owned land, most of them hope to get  a 50-year lease (bail 
emphytéotique) from the state and land rents for about 2,000 ariary/ha (i.e. about 0.80 
USD/ha).   
 
The targeted land is generally object of different use and property rights on the basis of 
different legal jurisdictions. Thus, different layers of rights are superimposed on the same 
land, each land ownership claims drawing their legitimacy from local practices of land access 
(lex loci) or positive law (lex fori). 
 
Some investors found themselves competing for land (Andrianirina Ratsialonana et al. 2011).  
These zones of disputed entitlement proves that the land fitting all the favourable investment 
criteria is not that extensive, and above all, not as extensive as forecast9. Moreover, in the 
past, these zones could have already been identified as rich in natural resources and 
favourable for economic development. Different valuations were successively planned even if 
they never induced any change in the land use. Each of these economic projects induced the 
formalisation of land rights trough different legal forms (Raison, 1984). Thus, as observed in 
numerous regions of Madagascar (Rakoto, 1995; Aubert et al., 2008; Teyssier et al., 2009), 
different layers of land rights result from the history of the zone. Whereas  most of the 
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 The political crisis discouraged some investors but was not the main cause. As observed in numerous 
developing countries, many investment projects did not materialise due to the world financial crisis and the 
stabilisation of food prices (World Bank, 2010). 
 
8 
 However, the list increases as one goes along the Land Observatory realizes new field studies. 
 
9 
 Indeed, although the methodologies and definitions used are open to question, potential arable lands are 
estimated to be about 15 to 20 million ha by FAO (2007), and 8 million ha by the Ministry of Agriculture (2008). 
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territory is not titled10, the area targeted by investors fitting all the criteria for favourable 
investment can happen to be located in quite intensively titled areas of rural Madagascar.  
 
Schematically, three layers co-exist. A first layer is composed of local land rights based on 
local land access practices and custom (lex loci).  Those vary from individual property rights 
(crops, housing) to collective management of use rights (pasture, wood harvesting). 
 
The second one is composed of legal rights proceeding from positive laws. On the targeted 
area, neighbouring plots can have different legal status: state-owned land including titled 
private property in the name of the state and land deemed to be “vacant and ownerless”, titled 
private property in the name of private landowners and untitled private property. Indeed, 
during colonial times, large tracts of land were claimed by French settlers. After Independence 
in 1960, the zones of colonization were abolished and land ownership reverted to the state 
(Ratsambarison, 1999).  Besides that, the government registered large tracts of land to develop 
large-scale plantations under public management. In the 1980s and the 1990s, following the 
international agencies’ recommendations to protect biodiversity, large operations were 
launched to register the land which would become part of the new natural reserves in the 
name of the state (Maldidier, 1999). The same kind of operations was conducted in the 
neighbouring areas except that the land was registered in the name of local landowners in an 
attempt to compensate them and to limit the agricultural frontier11. Besides, some landowners 
– generally local elites or farmers associations - also claimed for and/or acquired a land title. 
Lastly, due to the new land reform, local rights are now legally recognized except if the 
concerned plots are already registered and titled. However, most local land rights are not 
formalised through certificates. Indeed, only one-fifth of the local governments has a local 
land registry office and among these localities, only some individuals or households have 
asked for a certificate and, generally to register   the housing or the crop plots, but not the 
pastures (Observatoire du Foncier, 2011).  
 
A third layer is composed of use rights, based on custom and local practices, and secured by 
legal devices. In the 1990s, following international recommendations, Madagascar 
implemented a law organising the possibility of transferring local natural resource 
management from the state to local users organised in associations of users (loi GELOSE 
1996). This legislation aimed to improve the management of natural resources, to protect 
them from a free access system and to strengthen collective management rule (Tsitohae et 
Montagne, 2005). Each association has to carry out the demarcation of the area of land under 
its management and to secure its use rights through a contract with the mayor and the 
Ministry of Forests and Environment. Focusing generally on forest resources, the land was 
presumed to be state-owned land under the responsibility of the Ministry of Forest.  
 
                                                 
10 
 A total of 330,000 titles have been delivered over the last century, and only about 1,000 new titles are 
delivered annually. Only 1/15 of the territory would have been titled (Teyssier et al., 2008). 
 
11 
 Nevertheless, some of these operations were not finalised up to the identification of the landowners and 
the land is now Stat-owned land. 
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In certain areas, these different layers of rights overlap. Despite this legal pluralism, land use 
is not systematically source of conflicts. Local trade-offs are  established and often facilitated 
by the absence of the legal landowners (state or individuals).  
 
IV. Tensions and conflicts 
 
In contexts where different layers of right overlap, the investors’ request to access land is 
likely to create or to awaken tensions and conflicts, on land as well as on other issues. On the 
basis of the different case studies, two modalities of land access can be distinguished and 
restrict the panel of arguments used to negotiate.   
   
Legal procedure, dispute and change of legal forum  
 
To date, few developers have started the legal procedure to formally access land. They 
generally   have when their backers demand it (banks, shareholders). To purchase or rent land, 
the state land services demand compliance with several steps in order to verify that the 
targeted land is genuinely unoccupied in its ordinary sense,  “vacant and ownerless”.  
 
Until October 2010,  investors were asked to take the following steps:  obtain the mayors 
mayor's approval;  have the relevant tract of land mapped by the land registry service in order 
to check the absence of titled private property or untitled but occupied property; do a field 
visit by a recognition commission organized by the state land service to verify the presence of 
existing claims to land on the targeted area and, in that event, to restrict land available for 
development to genuinely “vacant and ownerless” tracts; have their file validated by the 
regional representatives of the concerned ministries and  ultimately validated by the Ministry 
in charge of land issues. 
 
These steps are usually fulfilled but their actual implementation is questionable. On the 
ground, mayors easily accept the establishment of  private agribusiness projects (see infra).  
During the first negotiations that are made between the investors, their team, the mayor and 
the leaders of the village, investors generally promise to not use the cultivated land and to 
furnish fodder in compensation of pastures. The investors, the mayor, and often the village 
leaders themselves usually consider the targeted area as state-owned land. Aware of the 
different layers of rights it is home to, mayors and most of village leaders believe that local 
compromises could be reached. Moreover, the projects still being at an initial stage, they are 
not necessarily conscious of the amount of land that the developer intends to occupy, even 
when given numbers. Some leaders are aware that their rights to cultivate or to use the pasture 
will be denied but might think that the decision, viewed as coming from the state and 
concerning state-owned land, is impossible to circumvent. Moreover, during this first 
negotiation, the developer and the mayor list the various commitments made by the developer 
(priority access for locals to jobs, construction of school, well or community clinic, payment 
of land fees). This list of material advantages constitutes strong incentives to accept the 
project, even if, as observed in numerous cases (Cotula et al., 2010), the compensation 
commitments are not legally binding. 
 
The state land services then draw a map of the concerned tract of land. However, the 
documents used by the state land services are not necessarily up-to-date: they may not show 
all titled property and do not feature the untitled private property. Even in the regions where 
state land services have been modernised and archives digitised, the corresponding software is 
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not systematically used. In these conditions, neither investors nor state agents can have an 
exhaustive knowledge of all the existing legal rights.   
 
The fieldwork of state land service officers is expected to compensate for the lack of a 
comprehensive inventory. A commission, which should be composed of a government land 
service agent, a surveyor, a representative of the local technical services (agricultural, forest 
and environment, etc.), the mayor, and of the leaders of the village concerned must disclose in 
a statement the presence of existing claims to lands on the targeted area. However, it often 
turns out that some of these actors, notably the neighbours of the land targeted for 
development, the owners of the titled or untitled land or the representative of the technical 
services, are not represented. Even in cases where the local government had a local land 
registry office and was signatory of VOI associations, it was found out that neither local 
officers nor VOI representatives had been invited to attend the commission. In addition, due 
to the novelty of a procedure on such large areas and insufficient investment put into the 
spreading of information, the potential landholders of the targeted land are not informed 
either. Under these conditions, local objections are rare and the statement issued by the 
commission is often restricted to the sole mention “nothing to declare”. As there is no 
formalised opposition, the targeted land is defined as state-owned land and the state is then 
allowed to register it in the name of the national investor, or in the state’s name to transfer 
rights of use to the investor.  
 
Thus, the procedure to access land is partially illegal (insufficient information before and after 
the commission, absence of the agent from the local land office in the commission, ignorance 
of the official contract linking the Ministry of Forest, the mayor and the VOI, ect). It allows 
neither the identification nor the respect of land rights, even of those duly recognized by 
positive laws. As a consequence, both private property rights formalized through a title and 
local property rights recognized by the new land reform are at risk.  
 
In only one case, have local users associations in charge of resources management (VOI) 
made one complaint. As the land access procedure was led in reference to the lex fori domain, 
the claimants formulated their claim in the same domain. The objections were addressed to 
one of the regional state service and legitimated on the basis of positive law.   The VOI 
underlined that that their activities and rights, are formally recognized in a contractsigned by 
the mayors and the Ministry of Forests and Environment. However, lack of knowledge, of 
money and of the relevant networks to engage in positive-law legal procedures discourage 
many local stakeholders from bringing their land claims to state institutions (Pronk & Evers 
2007). This was proved again by this very case study:  some other farmers explained that the 
protest was not even conceivable. They assumed that land had already changed hands simply 
because they had seen the developers, the local representatives and the officers of the state 
land services in the field and because they had heard that the mayor had put up some official 
documents. But the VOI associations and their tight connexion to the technical services eased 
the formalization of their request for a revision of the targeted area. It should be noted that 
this opposition also generated tensions amongst the different state’s technical services.  
 
This case suggests that the conflict will certainly be resolved between the state’s technical 
services and the Ministries, without involving the population. It also emphasizes that tensions 
are not only between developers and local groups. The investors’ requests can awaken 
tensions between different state services. Land claims are here legitimated on the basis of 
different legal orders belonging to the same legal jurisdictions (tensions between different 
positive laws).  
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Despite its the illegal dimension, the formal land access procedure induces a change in legal 
forum, from lex loci to lex fori (Evers et al, forthcoming), and risks denying legal use and 
property rights.  
 
Informal land access, tensions and negotiation in the local sphere 
 
Most investors opt for the establishment of informal land contracts. They approach the local 
mayorto present their project and negotiate informal land access with, sometimes, the support 
of the main representative of the regional government. They plan to engage the legal 
procedure subsequently. Their priority consists in doing the first plantations not only to do 
agronomic trials but also to attract new funders (nurseries, trials, “show” plantation). The 
study cases were conducted in communes without land registry office.  
 
In those cases, the developers have become acquainted with the different land rights. As the 
project is developing, they face different land ownership claims. Planning to valorize non 
cultivated land, they generate conflicts with stock breeders or landowners who have not yet 
cultivated their plot. The informal dimension of the land arrangement allows diverse 
objections to emerge. Cattle farmers and landowners legitimate their opposition on local land 
practices or legal devices. The developers generally interact with mayors and leaders of 
villages and not with the whole population.   
 
According to Borras and Franco (2010), it is at the local level that local elites and bureaucrats 
who stand to gain in new investments can easily manipulate negotiation processes and where 
local communities can easily be isolated from their potential national allies (Borras et Franco, 
2010). But it is also at the local level that trade-offs can be reached on local practices and 
positive-law arguments.  
 
Mister R. stated that his 600 ha plot was included in the area targeted by the developers. 
Although he was not able to show the title deed, Mr R. argued he was the legal owner. The 
mayor asked him why, as a legal owner, he was not paying his land fees (about 1$ per ha). 
Unable to pay such an amount of money, Mr R. finally accepted the mayor's offer. He would 
not perceive any direct compensation in return for the use of his land. But, as the developer 
would pay the land fees for him, he would be duly recognized as the legal owner and his land 
rights would be secured thanks to the land fees receipt. This solution induced no extra cost for 
the developers since those  had already accepted to pay the land fees on the whole targeted 
area.  
 
Some cattle breeders opposed the developers’ plantations on the grounds that there were 
limiting their pastures. Mentioning the continuous tensions opposing cattle owners and 
farmers due to crops damage, the mayor argued that the plantation extension would benefit 
not only the investors but all of the neighboring farmers. He finally convinced the stock 
breeders by offering them to be the first beneficiaries of the new project infrastructure.   
 
Tensions and conflicts arise not only between developers and local groups, but also amongst 
local groups. There are not only claims on the basis of competing legal jurisdictions, based 
respectively on local practices of land access (lex loci) and positive law (lex fori), but also 
land claims  legitimated on the basis of different legal orders drawing on different local 
practices. 
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Informal arrangement seems to leave more room for negotiation and compensation for local 
landholders. Nevertheless, this type of arrangement does not prevent conflict nor 
opportunistic behavior. In one case, a conflict emerged due to the discontent of one village not 
to benefit from the job opportunities. In another case, a village leader tried repeatedly to 
renegotiate the material compensation obtained in exchange of the use of part of the village 
land.  
 
Occasionally, but not always, the informal arrangement  is formalized through a convention 
approved by the communal local council or, in some rare cases, by the main representative of 
the region. This oral or written convention is not reviewed by the state land service. Thus, this 
first agreement is based on the parties’ interpretation of positive law and local/customary land 
rules. It proceeds neither from the lex fori nor from the lex loci. Moreover, it is not limited to 
the sole land issue but it includes the different developers’ commitments (priority access for 
locals to jobs, construction of school, well or community clinic, payment of land fees...). 
However, the local arrangement may prevent the expression of claims or objections during the 
future legal procedure and formally deny the landholders rights.  
 
Lastly, the local trade-offs could be challenged when the developer carries out investment in 
the concerned area as this amounts to a locally-valid appropriation strategy. According to 
local rules prevailing in some of the concerned areas, any land that is cleared or burned can be 
appropriated (Bidoux et al., 2008). Indeed, in Madagascar, or at least some of its regions, like 
in Sahel, « rights related to land or natural resources depend on the investment that has been 
carried out on it. […] Any investment gives permanent rights » (Lavigne et al., 2000). This 
effective appropriation can induce violent protest. To rephrase Hirschman analyze analytical 
scheme (1970), if stakeholders cannot not voice their protest in different legal forum and 
cannot not open a debate (voice option), they can act and burn the plantations down (exit 
option).  
 
V. Local politics: private projects welcomed in the same way as 
international aid  
 
Despite the diversity of the institutional trajectories followed by developers to present their 
project and negotiate land access, all investors address the mayor and see him as the keystone 
for negotiations. As most ongoing large-scale land investments are still at an initial stage, all 
developers are currently negotiating land access at the local government level.    
 
As observed in the context of international aid project, « external operators see the local 
government as a scale well adapted to their projects » (Bidoux et al., 2008 : 34). During the  
1990s, due to past international policies promoting the “local level”, local governments 
became a new administrative unit in numerous  southern countries. Results of the general 
paradigm shift towards decentralization and of the lesser confidence in the national 
government, local governments have gained new administrative powers and become the 
linchpin of local development. Despite their recent creation12, the Malagasy local 
governments represent now an effective administrative unit and became “privileged 
                                                 
12 
 In Madagascar, local governments were created in 1994 (law n°93-005). 
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interlocutors of development workers” (Bidoux et al., 2008). Following the same path as 
international aid projects private investors interact mainly with  mayors.  
 
Indeed, local governments have been seen as the most reliable locus of power and the most 
appropriate scale to curb corruption.  Although scholars have largely criticized these 
postulates (e.g. Blundo et Mongbo, 1988), developers  still bring these arguments up. For 
some, the mayor is outside of politicking and outside of the vicissitudes of national politics.  
« I really don't want to have anything to do with politics here. We created that [our project] 
on our own without any help from the state, except for that of the mayor… I don’t want to 
have connections with government members and to be labeled politically; it’s the reason why I 
have declines all invitations coming from the upper sphere”.  
  
Moreover, private investments develop in a way that makes them look very much alike 
international aid projects. Thanks to close contacts with various development projects, mayors 
have learned new skills and developed new expectations. To welcome a project means gaining 
access to new financial and material resources. Likewise, albeit tacitly, investors who want to 
settle in a locality must fund the development of the area. Thus, all developers commit 
themselves to building or improving social infrastructures (schools, hospitals, wells) and to 
favoring local recruitment. First works to build school and wells, or first gifts (cow sacrifice, 
building furniture, financial retribution) are usually made even before the agricultural project 
is properly launched. Sometimes legitimated on the basis of “custom” or anchored in a sort of 
“corruption-related investment” (Blundo et Olivier de Sardan, 2001), these gifts seek to 
strengthen the relationship between the investors’ team, the mayor and, more largely, the local 
society.  
 
From the mayors’ point of view, welcoming an agribusiness project is similar to welcoming  
an international aid project. It is a means to compensate for the deficiencies of the welfare 
state. In a context where state subsidies granted to local government are still low and local 
taxes are limited, the average annual budget of Malagasy communes is between 5000 and 
12,000 USD. The arrival of an investor is therefore seized upon as an opportunity to gain new 
resources and leverage. «Why are we giving our land to project C.? The Malagasy state 
doesn't even look at our village whereas we have lots of concrete advantages thanks to C. It 
pays the land fees that strongly increase the financial resource of my local government. 
Several times I asked the Minister: we need schools, we need hospitals. But they haven't done 
it. But on the contrary, C. did a lot. They built a school, they pay a teacher, and there are 
already 30 pupils. They also support a local association». Provided mayors show good 
bargaining power, investment projects can have major impacts on a locality, even before it 
creates all the promised jobs. Thanks to the land fees one project has already paid, the 
concerned local government has more than doubled its budget. 
 
Similarities between private agribusiness undertakings and development projects have been 
simultaneously fostered and fueled by the circulation of actors between the development and 
private investments spheres. Several case studies reveal that brokers of the land-related 
investments had strong work experience with international donors and development workers 
in general. Considering the expectations that accompany investment projects, these actors can 
recycle their skills and networks. These dynamics may explain why certain localities have a 
better power of attraction and benefit from an accumulation of projects with varying 
objectives while others entire areas are void of outside operators.  
 
13 
 
In the same vein, mayors act as brokers. As they were brokers of development projects, trying 
to attract, control and redistribute ‘development revenue’ (Birshenk et al., 2000; Moose, 
2005), they become brokers of international private investment project, trying to drain and 
valorize ‘private investment revenue’. The multiplication of projects, like the seminal case of 
the Malagasy commune of Ankilivalo (Bidoux et al., 2008), seems to have replicated in areas 
coveted by private investors. One mayor explained that “his”  commune had already hosted 
three private agricultural investment companies, that he had met with two further investors 
also wanting to valorize the local land and that, through these projects, he had weaved 
contacts with charities which  had already promised to bring help. 
 
Mayors mediate between the investor's team and the local society. Indeed, they are not only 
the authority from which developers seek agreement, they are also the ones in charge of 
leading the consultation with the grass-root administration level (fokontany) and with the 
population in general (fokonolona). Mastering the code and the language of both spheres, they 
adapt their language and their arguments to meet respectively the developers' and the local 
people's expectations. To legitimate their position, they claim a genuine will to enhance the 
well-being of the local society as a whole, even if, in practice, they support some interests 
more than others.   
 
Different examples show how mayors try to cope with the conflicts of interests that may 
emerge from the investor's ambitions. Some mayors find trade-offs and arrangements between 
investors and different interest groups (cf. supra). They show a capacity for integrating the 
different needs of each group. To agricultural farmers, the investment project is presented as a 
strong means to secure their crops from cattle. To cattle herders, they stress the fact that they 
have obtained  a commitment to furnish fodder, alternative pastures or shell from the 
investors. To landowners, they convince them of the benefits of having someone else pay for 
the land fees, as a means of securing their own land rights in the long term.  Other mayors try 
to smother protests that have been voiced locally. They give assurances to the developers that 
the conflict is resolved and that farmers are very satisfied with offered paid work. They try to 
convince the farmers that the project represent good opportunities for the area and especially 
for them. But some of them do not manage to maintain their broker’s position, facing the 
impossibility to couple their political mandate and their intermediate role. Sometimes trade-
offs are indeed too difficult to reach notably when the private investment project awakens 
existing social and political tensions.  
 
Offering – or promising to offer – financial and material resources, private investments can 
play a significant role in the « reshaping of the fields of power » already  triggered by 
decentralization reforms and fostered by international aid projects (Birshenk et al., 2000).  
Since the regulatory framework does not establish a clear distribution of competencies 
between regional and local governments, the distribution of power depends very much on the 
undertaking and capacities of the people in charge.  In this context, all new sizeable projects 
are likely, through developers’ choices (interlocutors, priorities, investments zones etc...), to 
influence local power relations.  On the basis of first case studies, mayors appear best 
positioned to welcome and negotiate with investors and, thereby, to use these investments as a 
way to secure greater autonomy from their hierarchical superiors. Thus private investment 
projects strengthen the power of  local governments but, contrary to the international aid 
project (e.g. Birshenk et al., 2000), they do not systematically endow local association or 
supra local organizations with new resources and bargaining power.  Acting as the main 
brokers, mayors do not necessarily improve communication between the developers and the 
local society. This factor contributes to explain the discrepancy between the potential risks 
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associated to large-scale land operations and the weak reactions to them (for a presentation of 
all other factors see Evers et al., forthcoming).  
 
Conclusion 
 
In line with the international institutions' recommendations (FAO, FIDA, UNCTAD, and the 
World Bank, 2010), new Malagasy land laws provide a framework to guarantee the respect of 
existing land rights. However, the land law is still recent and the large-scale acquisition 
processes are quite unusual. So far, only one-fifth of local governments do have a land 
registry office. Those have delivered 60 000 certificates but most local land rights are still not 
legally formalised. Lots of local elected and state representatives are not aware of the 
arrangements of these new laws. Above all, there is a need to take the ‘social working of law’ 
into account (Griffiths, 1992). Stakeholders interpret and react to laws in different ways. Thus, 
technical difficulties due to large land areas, deterioration of  land tenure and topographical 
records, insufficient knowledge or wilful ignorance of the new land laws, corrupt practices, or 
wish to see the project succeed explain the tension between the legislation and its effective 
enforcement.  
 
The legal recognition of local land rights is necessary but not sufficient to effectively protect 
them (Vermeulen & Cotula, 2010). Even if few developers have started engaging in legal 
procedure to access land, first field observations underline that practices or interpretation of 
the law often ignore or bypass official legal channels. Following, on the area targeted by the 
investors, land rights whether secured or not by certificate or even title deed, are partly not 
respected. In an unexpected way, local and informal land contracts between investors and 
mayors seem – at least in an initial stage – to leave more opportunities for the local groups to 
voice their claim.  
 
This emphasizes that the linchpin to guaranty local rights is to reinforce and expand the 
network of local land registry offices but also to open a real debate and increase local 
communities’ negotiation power with investors (Cotula et al., 2010). For the time being, the 
developers’ main interlocutors are the mayors of the local government. In a context where 
state subsidies are scarce, private agribusiness projects are welcomed just like international 
development projects would. This is all the more important since these private investment 
projects take on the international aid projects’ characteristics. There therefore is an important 
need to ensure better information on the projects and their diverse stakes. There is also a 
crucial need to assess local land tenure and land use which is made by the different 
stakeholders: the investors, the local elected and state representative, the diverse local groups 
and experts. In Madagascar, land issues are indeed so sensitive and complex that some 
investors have already expressed their will to participate in such assessment exercises. First 
research program and studies have started in Madagascar with the support of investors, 
international nongovernmental organisations, the network  of  civil  society  organisations 
working  on  land  issues, international funders, research institutes and the Malagasy land 
observatory. The challenge remains to associate the state representatives and to make this type 
of partnership and assessment systematic, or more simply, to reinforce the existing 
environmental impact assessment.  
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